Ephemeris

Continental Illinois,
too big to fail

1984 Crises & failures 4 min read

In May 1984 Continental Illinois, one of the largest banks in the United States, lost close to a third of its funding in ten days. Washington chose to protect all of its creditors, and a congressman soon gave that choice a name: “too big to fail”.

The fact

A run without queues

Based in Chicago, Continental Illinois grew at a dazzling pace in the 1970s on the back of heavy lending, notably to the oil and gas industry. At its peak it was the country's seventh-largest commercial bank by deposits, with some $40 billion in assets. It had bought a large volume of energy loans from a small Oklahoma bank, Penn Square, whose failure in 1982 exposed a book of doubtful credits. Above all, Continental gathered few retail deposits: it funded itself on the money markets, the eurodollar market in particular, from investors who could pull their money overnight.

Around 7 May 1984, rumours of failure set off the run. It was almost entirely electronic: large uninsured depositors moved their funds out by wire. In ten days the bank lost about 30% of its funding. On 17 May the FDIC, the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency announced an assistance programme: the FDIC guaranteed all of the bank's creditors, insured or not, and lent it $2 billion, while the Fed stood ready to meet any extraordinary liquidity needs.

The permanent rescue, in the summer of 1984, made the federal government the bank's owner: the FDIC took 80% of the holding company and injected $4.5 billion. At the time of the intervention, insured deposits made up only about 15% of Continental's liabilities. It would remain the largest bank failure in American history until Washington Mutual in 2008.

1984: Continental Illinois, too big to fail
What it reveals

The birth of an awkward doctrine

In September 1984, before a House subcommittee, the Comptroller of the Currency, C. T. Conover, acknowledged that the authorities had, for now, no way to handle the failure of the nation's largest banks. Connecticut Republican Stewart McKinney drew the conclusion: there was now, he said, a new kind of bank, one that was “too big to fail”. A phrase that had appeared only occasionally in the press became a concept.

The dilemma is one of moral hazard. By covering uninsured creditors too, the state prevents contagion, but it tells markets that some institutions will never be abandoned: they borrow more cheaply and can take on more risk. Since 2008 regulators have tried to break that link, through tougher capital requirements for systemic banks and resolution plans meant to make an orderly failure possible. In March 2023 the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, also brought down by its uninsured depositors, recalled the Chicago lesson.

A bank becomes dangerous the day everyone knows it will not be allowed to fall.