Ephemeris

The South Sea
bubble

1720 Markets & bubbles 3 min read

In 1720 the South Sea Company promised to turn Britain's national debt into shares. Its stock rose almost eightfold in a few months, then fell back below its January level before the year was out.

The fact

Debt in exchange for shares

Founded in January 1711 to ease Britain's public debt, the South Sea Company obtained the asiento under the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713: the monopoly on supplying enslaved Africans to the Spanish colonies, at 4,800 people a year for thirty years. The trade never brought it significant profit. Its future lay elsewhere, in the finances of the state.

On 22 January 1720 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Aislabie, put a plan to Parliament: convert a large share of the national debt into company stock. The Bank of England bid, the company outbid it, and the Commons accepted its offer, approved in amended form in April. The mechanism rested on the share price: the higher the stock, the fewer shares the company had to issue to absorb the debt, and the better the deal for it. It therefore had every reason to feed enthusiasm, including by lending its own shareholders the money to buy its shares.

The stock stood at about 128 pounds in January 1720. It reached 890 pounds in early June, then nearly 1,000 pounds in early August. By the end of September it had fallen back to 150 pounds, and to 100 pounds before the year ended. The Bubble Act, passed in June, required joint-stock companies to be founded by statute or royal charter, which hampered rival ventures.

1720: the South Sea bubble
What it reveals

When the share price finances the issuer

The episode left ruin and a political trial. The Commons found Aislabie guilty of corruption and he was imprisoned; Robert Walpole, charged with restoring confidence, gained the authority that would underpin his long tenure. Isaac Newton, then Master of the Mint, is said to have lost a sum that some estimates put as high as 20,000 pounds.

The lesson goes beyond the anecdote. When the price of a security determines the issuer's ability to raise funds, the issuer has an interest in pushing it up, and the loop meant to correct the excess feeds it instead. The pattern recurs whenever credit is used to buy the very asset that secures that credit. One question remains open: how far can a state entrust the management of its debt to a market?

A bubble feeds on what it promises to finance.